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Introduction
Economic development is normally associated with a declining share of agriculture in both workforce and output. After confirming this for a cross-section of developing and transitional countries, we establish a strong negative association, controlling for GNP/capita, between land inequality and agriculture's workforce share (section 2). High land inequality, originating from enforced land transfers in early development, is linked to abnormally low agricultural workforce shares, given GNP/capita, in Latin America, FSU countries, and Southern Africa.
If such workforce deagriculturalisation arises early in development, alternative employmentbased livelihoods are likely to be insufficient to sustain rural populations. Rural dependency, defined as heavy dependence on transfers from outside the rural area, accompanied by high unemployment, is one plausible outcome. Others include mass emigration (nineteenth-century Ireland), concentration in urban favelas, , and low-income rural stagnation with 'distress diversification'. Since all these outcomes appear undesirable, and involve agricultural shrinkage before other productive sectors can adequately absorb the shed farm labour, we call such cases 'premature deagriculturalisation' (PDA).
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To explore the processes, we must go beyond international cross-sections. Section 3 uses a South African survey [Kirsten et al. 2002] in a former 'homeland' area of Limpopo Province where deagriculturalisation has indeed led to rural dependency. 2 This outcome has been favoured by universal pension rights and a high-employment, even if capital-intensive, mining sector, so that many rural households survive by 'specialising' in receiving migrant remittances or pen-1 Among other unwanted side-effects, deficient rural earning opportunities stimulated urban slum growth (and associated unemployment and crime) -but not emigration. South Africa is a net immigrant country, partly because of sluggish agricultural earning opportunities elsewhere in Africa. 2 Recent sharp falls in agricultural employment suggest that rural dependency, although a long-run effect of land distributions associated with apartheid, may have intensified since its demise. Total paid farm employment fell only slowly in 1985-93 (from 1.32m to 1.14m). However, from 1994 to 2001, total employment in agriculture, fisheries and forestry -including self-employment -dropped by some 66%. [Vink and Kirsten 1999] .
sions. But is there a prima facie link between rural dependency and land inequality? In Limpopo Province, the estimated land Gini is 0.93 (Appendix), higher than almost any estimate worldwide [IFAD 2001: 117-9] . 3 The Limpopo survey was part of a comparative study, 4 so we compare some Limpopo results with analogous data from Rajasthan, India [Sagar 2002], with less extreme land inequality and no evidence of rural dependency. In rural Rajasthan, 83% of income is local (i.e. factor income of residents); in Limpopo, only 44%. Own-farm income accounts for almost all the difference. Limpopo income depends heavily on remittances and pensions, and to a lesser extent on rural civil service salaries; unemployment is very high. The rural non-farm (RNF) sector in Limpopo is not taking up the slack in employment or income.
Much of rural Asia experienced transition from heavy dependence on farm income to 'mature' deagriculturalisation, as prior growth of labour-intensive small-scale farming stimulated labour-intensive RNF growth 5 through forward, backward and consumption linkages [Mellor 1976 ]. This connection is supported by many micro-studies [Bell et al. 1982; Hazell and Roell 1983; Harriss 1987; Hazell and Ramasamy 1991] and by national studies of rural industrialization in China [Byrd et al. 1990 ] and 'proto-industrialisation' in fifteenth-century Flanders and elsewhere [Kriedte et al 1981; Ogilvie et al 1996] . Yet deagriculturalisation in the Limpopo survey area has brought, not other local income, but widespread household dependency on transfer payments alongside high adult unemployment, especially in the sub-regions with least widely distributed farmland. This suggests that the reduced agricultural workforce share 3 In South Africa, 15% of farmland is divided among about a million mainly African farm operators (mostly parttime), leaving 85% of land with some 60,000 white commercial farmers outside the surveyed (smallholding) areas [NDA 2001; Department of Land Affairs, 2002] . About 2% of land in large white-owned farms in 1994 had been redistributed up to the end of 2001, only about 5% of it through DLA projects and the rest through private transactions. 4 This paper derives from EU-supported research on the impact -on fertility, migration, and thus and otherwise agro-environmental sustainability -of land and asset size and distribution in selected rural drylands of Limpopo province, Rajasthan , and Botswana. 5 Such healthy RNF growth may also be happening in parts of sub-Saharan Africa [Reardon 1997; Bryceson 2000; Reardon and Barrett 2000] where land is less unequal than in Limpopo.
was premature -as was its main cause, separation of most rural households from significant control over land, leading to labour displacement by big, capital-intensive farms.
In providing survey evidence on possible effects of deagriculturalisation in South Africa, we say little about the processes causing extreme land inequality and labour extrusion. Sometimes de-agriculturalisation is a harbinger of development [Bryceson and Jamal (eds.) , 1997], but there may be less benign explanations connected to human agency. Colonial land grab is the most obvious candidate. The literature on 'deagrarianisation' and 'depeasantisation' argues that they were "sparked by 'turning point' policies in South Africa during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries". 6 As in Latin America and the FSU, so in South Africa: it was mainly political land seizures, not labour flight to new non-farm opportunities, that led to displacement of smallholders by large farms. Most black farmers were forced off their land, which was subsequently farmed in large holdings by whites, well before new industrial employment became available. White farm expansion, sometimes 'led' by wars of conquest, fuelled this process well before the 1913 Land Act, which confined over 85 per cent of farmland to whites. Subsequent expulsions of rural Africans, often into 'dumping grounds' offering unattractive farming prospects, continued until the 1980s. Some of the extruded labour was absorbed in mining, and from the 1940s in industry; until the 1940s, indeed, policies of forcing blacks off the land (leading to larger and more capital-intensive farms) were defended on grounds of 'labour shortage'. However, from the 1960s clear 'labour surplus' emerged. Population growth, continued forced removals of blacks from their farms, and rising displacement of labour by capital on white farms outweighed new off-farm prospects, leading to large and rising unemployment (now around 30%). Little land redistribution has occurred since the end of apartheid in 1994. We defer discussion of current land policy to the concluding section of the paper.
Land distribution, GNP per head and agricultural salience: the international evidence
In this section we use cross-national regressions to investigate the following hypotheses:
(a) the share of agriculture in GDP is inversely related to GNP per capita, (b) the share of agriculture in total workforce is inversely related to GNP per capita, (c) high land inequality depresses the output share of agriculture, (d) high land inequality depresses the workforce share of agriculture.
What theory and micro evidence might generate such regularities? (a) and (b) can arise in either a standard 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model or a two-good specific-factors model [Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003: ch.3] , with countries identical in either case except for exogenous differences in factor endowments. In the specific-factors framework, with manufactures produced by capital and labour and food by land and labour, it must be cross-country variations in capital per head rather than land per head that matter (otherwise land-rich countries will have both high GNP/head and high output and workforce shares in agriculture).
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(c) and (d) do not arise in a constant-returns-to-scale, perfect-competition world. There, farm size is indeterminate and variations in its distribution have no effect. In particular, the distribution of owned land has no impact on the distribution of operated land. However, we know that (i) farm size varies a great deal within countries and (ii) factor productivities vary systematically with it -e.g. the 'inverse relationship' [Heltberg 1998 ]. A good theory should explain both (i) and (ii). While land heterogeneity is, and non-constant technical returns to scale may be, important, the literature emphasizes transactions costs in factor and output markets.
7 A specific-factors model, with agricultural capital unimportant, becomes less plausible as development proceeds. Empirical H-O models explaining agriculture's trade share include Leamer 1984 , Lal and Myint 1996 , Wood 1994 For such costs to explain both (i) and (ii), imperfections in two markets are needed. 8 Eswaran and Kotwal [1986] assume perfect rental markets in labour and land but household-specific capital endowments (including owned land) together with convex supervision costs for nonfamily labour, and then show how agriculture will differentiate into four classes according to capital endowments. Richer households operate larger farms with lower labour-land ratios.
Historical evidence [Binswanger et. al. 1995] supports such a causal link from owned land inequality to operated land inequality.
How does land inequality affect agricultural employment and output? The aggregate labourland ratio equals the weighted sum of labour-land ratios for different farm sizes, the weights being the shares of total land in each size class. A labour-land ratio falling with farm size does not guarantee that an equalizing land redistribution raises total employment, since the shares of total land at both ends of the distribution may be reduced (Appendix). For any given equalizing redistribution, the more sharply the labour-land ratio falls with farm size, the more likely is total farm employment to rise; and the more sharply the output-land ratio falls with farm size, the more likely is total farm output to rise.
In developing countries, with increasing farm size the labour-land ratio falls sharply. In Pakistan in 1972, it fell from 9.15 workers/hectare on farms below 0.4 ha to 0.12 workers/hectare on farms above 60.7 ha; data for Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia and India were comparable.
Simulations showed that egalitarian redistribution would raise labour demand and use by 19-24% in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand and the Outer Islands of Indonesia, though by only 8.6% in Java [Booth and Sundrum 1984: 100-109, 279-80] . A plausible model of partial land redistribution on Brazil's estate sub-sector raised person-year equivalents of labour use in agriculture from 2.6 to 3.0 million over the 1978 base case [Kutcher and Scandizzo 1981: 201] .
This confirms Berry and Cline [1979:58] families have large farms -but all physical ratios are scale-invariant. 9 See above sources and Binswanger et al. [1995] . Booth [2002:85] shows 'post-Green-Revolution' Indonesian farm income/ha. steadily falling from Rp718,000 on holdings below 0.1 ha to Rp23,000 above 4.5 ha. Land productivity falls less sharply than the labour-land ratio, since labour productivity rises. 10 However, some endogenous differences -smaller, labour-intensive farms doing more to upgrade their landare implied by higher yields on smaller holdings on land of similar region, type or quality [Binswanger et al. 1995; Lipton 1993; Berry and Cline 1979] . Equation 1 shows that a 10% rise in GNP per capita is associated with a fall in the agricultural output share of 1.2% of GDP, supporting hypothesis (a). However, neither the Gini coeffi-11 By symmetry, the release of labour from agriculture might raise non-agricultural output by lowering wages. Such effects may be assumed to be small in labour-surplus economies. 12 We include all countries with available data. To allow for variations in country size we weight observations by the square root of total workforce. If countries may be viewed as aggregates of independent regions, then the error variance decreases with country size suggesting this initial heteroscedasticity correction [Blanchet 1988 ]. (the dummy variable regression suggests a somewhat larger effect).
When mean farm size is added to the equations, it is everywhere insignificant. This is perhaps not surprising, as discussed above. However, the land Gini and mean farm size are highly (nonlinearly) correlated -the sample rank correlation is 0.71-so to some extent the superior statistical performance of the Gini may be an artifact of the linearity of our estimating equations.
An analytical anatomy of rural African livelihoods in Limpopo province
The cross-country evidence suggests a strong association between unequal land and the employment share in agriculture, given GNP per head. This does not imply that 'deagriculturalisation' has even occurred in any given case, still less that it has been 'premature'. High land inequality could theoretically arise from the spread of large settler ranches into empty land, but, in practice, self-serving 'terra nullius' interpretations of history have been found wanting. 15 The apartheid era in South Africa provides an extreme example of forced concentration of land and other non-labour agricultural resources in large farms with low labour-land ratios.
Our case study of livelihoods in one of the affected areas aims to shed light on whether deagriculturalisation in this case was premature. For some purposes, we cluster the sub-districts into three 'regions': West, South and Central.
The household sample and the survey area
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• 'West' (sub-districts Mokerong and Phalala) comprises areas west of the provincial capital, Polokwane (Pietersburg). African-farmed and white-farmed areas alike are relatively 15 See, for example, Bennett and Powell [1999] , Reynolds[2003] 16 The proportion of households selected differed across villages. Unless otherwise stated, all statistical calculations use weights inversely proportional to the probability of a given household having been selected. 17 We depart in one respect from the administrative regional sub-division: on geographical and agro-ecological grounds, Zebediela sub-district is included in our 'South'. dry, with extensive livestock production the dominant farming activity, although some dryland maize and other crops are produced, in white farms under borehole irrigation.
White-owned farms include game and beef ranches and large-scale potato, vegetable and citrus producers. A typical white commercial farm neighbouring Phalala or Mokerong employs 100-200 full-time workers, generating substantial African employment.
• 'Central' (sub-districts Seshego and Bochum) villages enjoy effective transport links with Polokwane; many household members work (and spend) there or in Pretoria, 2.5 hours by road. Farming is mainly a residual activity, with some livestock and limited cropping.
• 'South' (sub-districts Zebediela, Schoonoord and Praktiseer) villages are the most remote, located deep in ex-homelands, far from white-owned farms. Farming features variable dryland maize and sorghum production with limited livestock. Zebediela, however, also has a large citrus estate and some small-scale irrigated vegetable production.
Incomes, assets and unemployment at all-sample level
Here we show that Limpopo, alongside high land inequality, 18 has a profile of rural African livelihoods characterized by low average shares, in total income, of agricultural income, and indeed of local income as a whole. The latter implies dependence on external (i.e. non-local) incomes in the form of pensions and remittances. We use data from a parallel survey in dryland areas of Rajasthan [Sagar 2002 ] to illustrate a more typical profile, with roughly similar agro-ecology to Limpopo, somewhat lower income and higher poverty -but much more widespread access to farmland and water. In both surveys, three village clusters were selected, with contrasting rainfall in the range 35-55 cm, in each case with a marked rainy season. (a) All estimates are weighted means, with weights inversely proportional to selection probabilities; (b) 'hhinc' is income per household; 'aeqinc' is income per resident adult equivalent: the no of aes per household is defined as (adults plus 0.5*children)^0.5; 'remit' is remittance income in goods and cash; 'pens' is pensions; 'farm' is sales of agricultural produce plus estimated production for own-consumption; 'hhwea' and 'aeqwea' are wealth per household and per adult equivalent; 'hhassts' are household assets; 'fmassts' are inanimate farm assets. (c) Asset valuations are those provided by respondents, except for livestock (valued at prevailing market prices) and land in Limpopo (valued at 1500
Rand/ha). Agricultural wages 22 account for a further 3% in Rajasthan and 4% in Limpopo, so local agriculture accounts for 41% and 8% of income respectively, though the low Limpopo figure hides sharp regional differences (Section 3.4). Further, the similar shares of wages, and of non-agricultural wages, 23 conceal an important difference between the RNF sectors. In Rajasthan, of the 45% of income from wages, none derives from civil service employment; in Limpopo the wages share is 39%, over a third of which (14% of all income) is so derived. This suggests that the relative insignificance of (former homeland) agriculture in Limpopo is accompanied by relative weakness in the RNF sector. This is confirmed by greater RNF activity in the less 'deagriculturalised' West region.
The minor role in livelihoods of own-farm output is underscored for Limpopo by a comparison of landless and landed households. 24 Though an estimated 43% of Limpopo households are land-19 At PPP exchange rates, sample income per adult equivalent is 50% higher in Limpopo than in Rajasthan. Using the official rural poverty line in Rajasthan, household poverty incidences are respectively 20% and 29%. 20 Henceforth we omit the qualifiers; our surveys are restricted to rural dryland areas in both cases and additionally to former homeland areas in Limpopo. 21 Our 'income' measure is imperfect. We estimate production for own-consumption using household reports of the fraction of needs so met. Farm income is defined as production for own-consumption plus sales, i.e. without subtracting input purchases, on which data were unavailable . 22 This risks double-counting if smallholders earn wages on each other's farms (rather than on large commercial farms, as happens to an unknown extent in Limpopo), so the totals given are likely to be overestimates. 23 Estimated employment in agriculture, including self-employment, is only 22% of all rural employment in Limpopo (about 44% in Rajasthan). The employment numbers, estimated from individuals who reported a sector of work, must be treated with caution; some individuals may have failed to report a sector of work, even though they work on their own land. 24 Access to common grazing land is not taken into account in our measure of landholding. However, absence of cropland is strongly associated with lack of livestock, and therefore with lack of benefits from common grazing.
less, these average no less income than the landed. 25 In Rajasthan, where only 7% of households are landless, they average 37% less income than the landed. The small economic role of own-account farmland for African households in Limpopo is emphasised by their comparatively low share of wealth held in the form of land (table 2) . 26 It is not that these households are without land area: the 43% with land average 2.9ha (93% and 1.7ha in Rajasthan) and distribution among landed households is reasonably even (Gini=0.35), but this dryland has low productive capacity, being largely unirrigated. With rainfall scanty and unreliable, purchased farm inputs (which are widely available) are seen by Limpopo smallholders as too costly or risky, given credit costs and constraints; for many decades, land, rural power, irrigation, credit and research were heavily steered towards large farms -much more so than in Rajasthan, where smallholders purchase many farm inputs, including appropriate improved seeds and irrigation.
Though landedness within this former 'homelands' area does not increase average income, it might reduce poverty risk (for instance, landedness might reduce income variance). To assess this, we use a poverty line comparable to that used for Rajasthan. 27 It happens to identify about 20% of the Limpopo households as income-poor. Landed households have higher estimated poverty than landless ones (23% versus 16%, p=0.11); a finer disaggregation of households by land size suggests no significant association with poverty risk either way, in contrast to the strong negative relationship shown in several other developing countries [Ravallion and 25 The null of equality of income per household between landed and landless households cannot be rejected in Limpopo, but is rejected in Rajasthan at the 1% level. 26 The asset value and share estimates must be treated with caution; see Table 2 , note (c). In the Limpopo exhomeland area, land is rarely traded; the assumed value (1500 Rand/ha) is based on market prices for comparable land in adjacent commercial farming areas [Department of Land Affairs, 2002a] . Livestock aside, other asset valuations in Rajasthan and Limpopo are by household respondents. 27 Our poverty line is the rural expenditure per person needed in Rajasthan to achieve the Indian poverty line [Dr. S. Sharma, Delhi School of Economics, pers. comm., using 1999-2000 round, National Sample Survey]. We converted this into Rand using the PPP exchange rate. In both Rajasthan and Limpopo we used sample mean adult equivalents per household to convert the per person line into a per-aeq line, which for Limpopo is 1594 Rand/aeq/yr. Lacking expenditure data for Limpopo we had to ignore below-poverty-line differences between expenditure and income. Sen 1994; IFAD 2001:76] . 28 To sum up: land distribution within this former African homeland taken as a whole does not appear, on its own, to explain variation in household income or poverty risk. This fits in with the low share of own-farm income in household income.
In most of the few cases (mainly in West Africa) where landed rural households are no better off than the landless, it is because the latter have moved from low-productivity farming into local non-farm activities. This is not the case in the Limpopo survey areas, so the lack of surveyed welfare differences between landed and other households within these areas is surprising. A major explanation (Appendix) may be that the penning-up of over 60% of Limpopo's farmland with barely 2% of farms -often in other areas -has led to the pre-emption, by these farms and areas, of the lion's share of irrigation, improved technology and modern inputs.
Hence landholding in the ex-homelands on average yields little income (while the growth of an African RNFS is hampered by the absence of much local demand for rural non-farm production).
Some support for this is provided by our later disaggregation by region. This shows that for a minority of regionally concentrated non-poor households (in West), the possession of large livestock and inanimate farm assets is important to livelihoods, and strongly correlated with size of landholding (section. 3.4). That escape from poverty through agriculture in Limpopo is possible may have important implications for the possible benefits to be derived from land reform, and from research or infrastructure provision that raises the productivity of smallholders' land and other farm assets.
If landlessness as such is not responsible for poverty on average, what is? Are Limpopo's poor special in terms of income structure or asset structure (table 2)? The poor derive a similar mean share of income from wages as the non-poor, 29 but a larger share from pensions and a smaller share from migrant remittances. As will be shown, these averages are a manifestation of (a) sharp specialisation by income-source among households in general, and (b) relatively high and relatively low poverty incidence, respectively, among households mainly dependent on pensions and on migrancy. 30 On assets, table 2 shows that poor households on average hold low shares in productive non-land farm assets, especially large livestock and inanimate farm assets. Ownership of such assets is highly skewed. The Gini of wealth is 0.48, but the concentration indices for farm assets and largestock are 0.89 and 0.80 respectively.
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Only about one household in six has any inanimate farm assets at all, and only one in six has any large livestock; one in sixteen has both, and poverty in this subgroup is essentially zero.
Is it worklessness that explains the bulk of poverty? Our survey indicates extremely high unemployment among working-age persons for rural Limpopo (table 3) . 8%, though not disabled, were 'not seeking work'; we count these 'discouraged workers' as unemployed, as well as those so reporting. Estimated unemployment is then 60% for males and 70% for males and females together. An estimated 60% of households have nobody of working age employed (we call such households 'workless', not quite accurately). Given the high mean share of wages in income and the low salience of farm incomes, one might assume that poverty would be concentrated in workless households; its incidence is indeed somewhat higher in them, although not very significantly (23% compared to 16% in working households, p=0.14). Yet income per adult equivalent in workless households is, on average, no less than in households with one working individual of working age. The implication, examined below, is that mean income shares are obscuring a specialisation among households, whereby worklessness (or wagelessness) is associated with higher incomes from remittances and/or pensions. 30 Depth of poverty, however, is significantly lower for pension-dependent households (defined below; estimated mean income per adult equivalent among the poor is 23% below the poverty line) than for others (around 50%). 31 The concentration index is analogous to the Gini. For instance the associated Lorenz curve for, say, largestock has households ordered by wealth on the x-axis and the cumulative share of total largestock on the y-axis. 
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This striking distinctness, or 'three-way-split', of households may account for some earlier findings. If high non-local incomes were associated with low local incomes (and high unemployment), then a weak or absent link between poverty and worklessness or landlessness might result. 33 Our Limpopo data exhibit these associations. Estimated rank correlation coefficients between 'local' income (farm income plus wages) and pensions and remittances respectively are minus 0.297(p=0.000) and minus 0.308(p=0.000).
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32 As for gender, the female/male ratio is 2.10 in MD households as against 1.34 for FRs. However, this is probably an effect of selective male migration, not a cause of MD status. 33 The weak association may also be partly due to offsetting effects of much higher unemployment among both households with pensions (which have high poverty incidence) and with migrancy income (which have little poverty) than among households with neither. 34 A rank correlation test is more appropriate than a linear one given the highly bunched nature of the data (many zeroes). The correlation for local income against (pensions plus remittances) was -0.44 (p=0.000). The same tests on our Rajasthan sample give a very small positive, insignificant correlation between local income and pen-For a further test, we divided the sample according to whether pension and remittance income together were sufficient to push the household above the poverty line; about half the sample are 'externally subsistent' on this definition. Local income in externally subsistent households averages only 18% of local income in other households (76% in Rajasthan, where 11% of households are externally subsistent).
So the negative association between external and local incomes is strong in Limpopo. To test the association between external income sources and unemployment -while avoiding the selection bias that automatically links FR-households with lower unemployment -we reclassified households, not as FR-PD-MD, but according to whether they had any pension income (43%) or any remittance income (45%; 18% have both). In line with the income correlations, the male unemployment rates in pension-receiving and remittance-receiving households are similar, in the range 75-80% (table 3) , against 34% in the 30% of households with no such external income. 35 This association is robust to the inclusion of controls, as shown in the probit analysis (table 5) of individual employment status on education status, region and whether or not the household is in receipt of pension or remittance income. For example, a working-age male in a pension-receiving household has an employment probability 34.4% lower than in a non-pension-receiving household in the same region and similar in education. The corresponding figure for a member of a remittance-receiving household is 28.5%. Note also that (a) while higher education substantially raises employment chances, secondary education reduces them, and (b) living in West is much better for employment prospects than living in South or
Central.
sions and small negative correlations between local income and, respectively, remittances (rho=-0.12, p=.003) and pensions (rho=-0.10, p=0.02) 35 As one would expect (because the definitions of PD and MD select households that have little local income and accordingly low employment of residents), the male unemployment rates in the PD and MD households that together account for 59 %t of all households are even higher, at 93% and 92% . Why are resident adult unemployment rates so much higher in pension/remittance receiving households? Suppose first that resident household composition is exogenous (so that unemployment does not make the unemployed likelier to shift into such households). Then an external income source may reduce the incentive for residents to seek work in either household type, increasing their unemployment rate (recall that we count able-bodied adult non-workseekers as unemployed, 'discouraged workers'). But why, then, are recipients of pensions and remittances more willing to share income with unemployed residents than are recipients of local factor incomes? For households reliant on remittances, migrancy may be cyclical, so that household members take turns to migrate for work. That apart, if the relatively competent (and educated) tend to migrate, then those left behind are more likely to be unable to find work even if they are motivated to do so. This still leaves the question of why pensioners are willing to share income with fellow-adults with unemployment rates so far above those in households receiving neither pensions nor remittances. Now allow for endogeneity in household composition -an impact of income types upon decisions about household formation, modification and destruction. Households unable to provide a minimum of subsistence to their members must collapse; conversely working-age individuals, especially if unemployed, may try (perhaps successfully) to attach themselves to viable households, including those de-pendent on non-local income. Perhaps, especially in PD households, such attachments involve an element of coercion.
What do we learn about rural dependency from the mean characteristics of the dependent households of each type (Table 4) ? There are significant differences in income per adult equivalent among the three groups. MDs are 60% better off on average than FRs, who are themselves twice as well off as PDs. Poverty incidence (only 6% for MD households) is a little higher for FRs than for PDs, 29% versus 26% -and FRs' mean poverty depth is also far higher, despite their much higher mean income than PDs. This reflects much higher income inequality among FR households than among PD households, as would be expected (Ginis in   table 4 ). However, we do not find significant mean wealth differences among the groups. As far as wealth shares are concerned, there is a hint that farm assets (for FR households) and largestock (for FR and PD households) may be associated with absence of poverty. 36 However, this does not benefit many households, since holdings of both these assets are highly concentrated. It seems that such limited degree of household 'escape' from rural dependency to factor reliance as is possible without land redistribution in Limpopo (a) brings more productive (but riskier?) wealth, not more wealth; (b) raises mean income and cuts poverty, but leaves a group of very poor households behind. Table 4 3.4 Regional variations: agriculture and livelihoods in West
Our survey data (table 6) reveal significant regional variations, especially between West and the other two regions. In short, West is the most prosperous region: poverty incidence is about half that in the other two regions, and unemployment is markedly lower. 37 Only in West does agriculture account for a substantial fraction of income, both through own-farm production and agricultural wages, and only in West are there important holdings of large livestock and inanimate farm assets. Households that own both of these assets do well. To a considerable extent, it is more widespread access to higher local factor incomes from farming that makes African households somewhat better off in West than elsewhere in Limpopo.
As regards the comparative importance of agriculture to income in the three regions, adding own-farm income to agricultural wages shows that agriculture in Central and South accounts for no more than 3% of income, but 32% in West, of which about a third is own-farm income.
Agriculture accounts for 5% of employment (including self-employment) in Central, 14% in South, and 52% in West. In West (a) wider access by Africans to small, family-labourintensive holdings offers prospects of higher, more diffused own-farm income; (b) whiteowned land used for game and beef ranches, and borehole-irrigated maize and potato production -even if not always near the survey areas -offers better chances for African farm wage income than in other regions, though less than would be the case with smaller-scale farming of this land.
So agriculture is important to livelihoods in West through both own-farm income and wages. What of escape from rural dependency through RNF incomes? We cannot measure the extent to which these in West are underpinned by demand from agricultural incomes, but virtually all non-agricultural local wages in this region are generated in industry and services -in Central and South, 62% and 40% respectively of wages derive from civil service employment.
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Hence, despite the high share of income deriving from agriculture in West, the share of income deriving from industry plus service-sector wages is higher than in Central or South (26% compared to 16% and 22%). Total income from local, non-civil-service activity accounts for 59% of total income in West (Central 18%, South 25%, 83% in Rajasthan).
In sum, rural dependency in West, though substantial, is lower than in Central and South.
47% of households are MD or PD households (69% in Central and South; 11% in Rajasthan).
West represents, in some senses, a bridge between the rest of Limpopo's experience and that 
Summary and policy implications
Cross-sections of developing and transitional countries show a very strong association between land inequality and agricultural workforce share, given GNP/capita. Historical evidence of dramatic land concentration in early development suggests that this may reflect a causal process in individual countries, whereby land grabs have led to premature deagriculturalisation. The Limpopo ex-homeland survey illustrates the impact on rural livelihoods. Shares of income and assets associated with agriculture are very low (8% and 22%); half the households derive less than one-fifth of income from any local sources; 59% of households 'specialize' in dependency on either migrant or pension income; male unemployment is also 59%, and much higher in the 'specialist' households; farmland-per-household is as much as 2.8 hectares among the 57% with cropland, but the landed are no better off than the landless in terms of poverty risk or income. Such outcomes are less marked in West region (with more widely spread farmland), and are almost absent in a parallel survey in Rajasthan.
What implications have these findings for policy change in rural S Africa? Experience in many countries confirms the feasibility of poverty reduction via land redistribution, and of subsequent growth in farm output and employment. About 3 in 4 of S Africa's dollar-poor are rural, almost all being Africans in former 'homelands' such as our survey area; rural poverty [Deininger and May 2000] . However, subsequently, the Government largely replaced that approach by efforts to individualise communal tenure; to broaden ownership of white farms through 'equity sharing'; and, above all, to obtain voluntary transfer of some white-owned farmland into middle-to-large African commercial farms [Wegerif 2004 ]. Such a transfer will not achieve the full gains to the poor, and reductions in dependency and unemployment, that appear, from cross-sections, to be possible by a shift from larger to smaller farms.
An objection to such a shift [Reardon and Barrett 2000] is that commercialisation has marginalised small-scale farmers in developing countries, excluding them from the profitable markets of the rich North. However, South Africa's African-run farms are mostly net buyers of food, so that extra output is home-consumed, or cater mainly for local markets, so that problem is less important. Where small farmers do sell for exports and supermarkets, intermedia-tion may be needed to facilitate timely collection for processing, crop uniformity, pesticide safety, or labour standards; where this is successfully achieved, including in some African cases (tea in Kenya, cotton in Burkina), smaller farms' advantages resurface. But successful intermediation may not be profitable, and even if it is cannot be taken for granted without public or collective action.
The merits of land redistribution in any specific case cannot be assumed. Can South Africa (or Russia), with farming already settled into severe asset and input inequality, consensually 'undo history' and improve outcomes by reverting to a more equal small-farm model? Will disruption costs, e.g. with capital assets and water systems geared to large-scale farming, be excessive? Can rural people long deprived of land and other relevant resources -and the supply systems that might service these -operate in a small-farm environment (however attractive in cross-section), or is it true that peasant sectors 'when once destroyed, can never be 
